Cryptoassets Regulatory Intelligence cryptoassets.gi
US-AK v13.3.0
content: ai_generated legal review: never_reviewed (informational) publication gate: 0 failing11 sources retrieved model claude-sonnet-5 · 2026-08-05

Alaska, USA

US-AK schema crypto-v2.0.0 trajectory: not yet assessedin transitionoverlaps: FIM, WPM

Last updated · 9 categories · 10 sourced findings · 34 sources in the cumulative register

9Categoriesbaseline.
10Findings.claims[]
6Tier-1 sourcesrun_metadata.t1_source_count
Confidence mix (sums to 9 rendered categories; click to filter)
No categories moved this cycle.

United States federal law that applies in Alaska, USA is covered once, on the United States page. This page covers Alaska, USA’s own layer: its own law, regulators and enforcement.

Jurisdiction lead brief

Latest update · 18 October 2026

Lead Signal

Alaska has moved from a conditional, fiat-leg-only treatment of virtual-currency business activity to an explicit, enacted licensing perimeter covering exchange, transfer, storage and administration, with the kiosk-specific sub-regime already in force and already enforced against a national operator. SB86 (Ch. 48 SLA 26) replaces Alaska's prior money-transmission statute to require a license before engaging in virtual-currency business activity; most provisions take effect 1 July 2027, with existing money-services licensees permitted to continue under current licenses until renewal or 1 July 2028, whichever is later. SB249 (Ch. 50 SLA 26) created a dedicated, faster-moving licensing and approval regime for virtual-currency kiosk operators, effective 1 October 2026, requiring a money-transmission license and the Division of Banking and Securities' prior approval before locating a kiosk, plus quarterly per-kiosk reports and an annual report on gross revenue, refund requests and suspicious-transaction reports.

9 of 9 categories
Signal
Density

Selections OR within a group, AND across groups. Press / to search.

#

Alaska has no bespoke crypto-asset statute; virtual currency business activity is now explicitly brought within the general money-transmitter licensing regime (AS 06.55) via SB86 (Ch. 48 SLA 26, enacted 2026-06-30), with a separate kiosk-specific licensing/conduct regime under SB249 (Ch. 50 SLA 26, effective 2026-10-01). Most of SB86's substantive provisions commence 2027-07-01. Alaska DBS has already used its existing/kiosk authority to co-lead a $2.5M multistate BSA/AML enforcement settlement against kiosk operator Coinme.

Standing sub-brief · as of 25 August 2026170 words · last cycle 2026-10-18

Crypto Licensing

A person must obtain a money transmission licence before engaging in virtual currency business activity in Alaska. This requirement, enacted under SB 86 (Ch. 48 SLA 26), is enacted but not yet fully effective. A parallel and more time-bound requirement applies to virtual currency kiosk (crypto ATM) operators under SB 249 (Ch. 50 SLA 26): kiosk operators must hold a money transmission licence and obtain prior state approval before siting a kiosk, effective 1 October 2026. Alaska has no statute addressing staking, DeFi lending, mining, node operation, validator activity or tokenization; the licensing expansion this cycle is confined to the money-transmission/kiosk perimeter. The primary framework is the Alaska Uniform Money Services Act (AS 06.55) as amended by SB 86 and SB 249, supervised by the Alaska Division of Banking and Securities.

Periodic update · new data 2026-10-18

Crypto Licensing

Alaska's crypto licensing framework has been restructured around two companion statutes amending AS 06.55, the Alaska Uniform Money Services Act. SB86 (Ch. 48 SLA 26) requires a license before engaging in virtual currency business activity, bringing exchange, transfer, storage and administration conducted on behalf of customers within Alaska's money-transmission licensing perimeter. Most of SB86's provisions take effect 1 July 2027; existing money-services licensees may continue operating under their current licenses until renewal or 1 July 2028, whichever is later. This transitional design gives incumbents a multi-year runway while establishing a firm forward commencement date for the licensing requirement itself.

SB249 (Ch. 50 SLA 26) took a narrower, faster path specific to virtual-currency kiosk operation. It requires kiosk operators to hold a money-transmission license and to obtain the Division of Banking and Securities' prior approval before locating a kiosk in Alaska, and it imposes quarterly per-kiosk reporting and an annual report covering gross revenue, refund requests and suspicious-transaction reports. These provisions are already in force, effective 1 October 2026.

The practical force of the kiosk licensing regime was demonstrated almost immediately. The Alaska Division of Banking and Securities co-led a 34-state enforcement action against Coinme, Inc., resulting in a consent order dated 8 October 2026 that requires Coinme to shut down its kiosks, complete an independent BSA/AML review, and pay 2.5 million dollars in administrative penalties and costs. This is the clearest evidence available this cycle that Alaska's modernised licensing perimeter is being actively supervised, not left as unenforced statutory text, within days of the kiosk-specific provisions taking effect.

One specific element of the licensing framework remains unconfirmed this cycle: SB86 is understood to impose net-worth and surety requirements and a tiered fee model on virtual-currency business activity licensees, but the specific dollar figures for these prudential thresholds were not located. This is recorded as a sourcing gap rather than a substantive finding, and it leaves the cost of compliance with the broader 2027 licensing tier only partially characterised. Separately, token classification for securities or commodities purposes is not addressed by AS 06.55 as amended; that function remains with federal authorities, and Alaska's statute defines virtual currency and virtual currency business activity for licensing purposes only, without establishing a parallel state-level token taxonomy.

Outlook

The governing date ahead is 1 July 2027, when SB86's main licensing provisions commence and the virtual-currency business activity licensing requirement becomes operative for all licensees, including, as scheduled, the net-worth and surety requirements whose precise figures remain to be confirmed. The 1 July 2028 date marks the final point at which incumbent money-services licensees must transition to the new licensing structure. Given the Division's demonstrated willingness to enforce the kiosk sub-regime within days of its effective date, firms planning virtual-currency business activity in Alaska should not assume a slow supervisory ramp-up once the broader 2027 requirement takes effect, though this is an illustrative reading of the current trajectory rather than a prediction of specific supervisory conduct.

4 earlier distinct update(s)
Periodic update · new data 2026-10-11

Crypto Licensing

Alaska's crypto licensing framework was materially tightened by the enactment of the Alaska Uniform Money Transmission Modernization Act, SB86 (Ch. 48 SLA 2026), on June 30, 2026. The statute repeals and reenacts large portions of AS 06.55 and establishes an express statutory requirement that a person engaging in virtual-currency business activity to, from, or within Alaska must hold a money-transmission licence under AS 06.55, unless exempt under AS 06.55.802. This replaces what had previously been an administrative-code gloss on the money-transmission statute with a direct, legislatively enacted licensing perimeter specifically naming virtual-currency business activity as a licensed activity. The Alaska Division of Banking and Securities is the designated supervisory authority responsible for administering this regime.

The new regime introduces NMLS-based licensing and background-check procedures: the Division now coordinates multistate regulation, licensing, and supervision through the Nationwide Multistate Licensing System, with criminal background checks for licensees run through that same system. Existing money-services licensees are not required to transition immediately; they may continue operating under their pre-SB86 licenses until the earlier of their next renewal or July 1, 2028. This creates a multi-year window during which legacy and newly licensed virtual-currency money transmitters may operate under differing procedural regimes simultaneously.

Two material gaps remain open in the record. First, whether the Division of Banking and Securities has adopted implementing regulations under SB86 since its June 30, 2026 enactment has not been confirmed. Second, whether Alaska's pre-SB86 requirement that virtual-currency money transmitters post a $500,000 surety bond under AS 06.55.104(f) survives unchanged under the reenacted AS 06.55, or was itself revised, is unresolved. Both gaps bear directly on the practical compliance burden facing any operator seeking entry or renewal under the new perimeter.

Outlook

The most consequential near-term marker is the publication of any implementing regulations under SB86, which would clarify the surety-bond question and the precise scope of the AS 06.55.802 exemption. The transition deadline of July 1, 2028 for existing licensees represents the practical horizon by which the full licensee population will operate exclusively under the modernised, NMLS-integrated regime.

Periodic update · new data 2026-10-04

Crypto Licensing

Alaska's crypto-licensing perimeter changed structurally on 1 October 2026 with the simultaneous commencement of Senate Bill 86 and Senate Bill 249. SB 86, the Alaska Uniform Money Transmission Modernization Act (Ch. 48 SLA 26), requires a person to hold an Alaska money-transmission licence, obtained through the Nationwide Multistate Licensing System, before engaging in virtual currency business activity, a term defined to capture exchanging, transferring, storing or administering virtual currency on behalf of another. This requirement is Confirmed, corroborated directly by the enrolled statutory text, a Tier 1 primary source, and is assessed as carrying high materiality and binding legal effect.

SB 249, the Virtual Currency Kiosks Act (Ch. 50 SLA 26), layers a second, location-specific licensing requirement on top of the general one. Virtual-currency kiosk operators, commonly described as Bitcoin-ATM operators, must hold the same money-transmission licence and must separately obtain Division of Banking and Securities prior approval for each individual physical kiosk location before that location may begin operating. This requirement is likewise Confirmed, corroborated by the legislature's own bill-history record, a Tier 1 source, and carries the same high materiality and binding classification as the general licensing requirement.

Accompanying both licensing requirements is a materially increased penalty regime. The maximum civil penalty for unlicensed money-transmission or virtual-currency activity rises to a reported ten thousand dollars per day for each day a violation continues. This figure is sourced from Tier 3 secondary legal commentary; the general mechanism of a penalty increase is corroborated by the statute, but the specific numeric figure has not been independently cross-checked against the enrolled statute's own section numbers, and is accordingly assessed as Probable rather than Confirmed.

The primary supervisory framework for both licensing tracks is the Alaska Uniform Money Services Act, codified at AS 06.55, as amended by SB 86 and SB 249, with the Alaska Division of Banking and Securities as the supervisory authority. The overall trajectory for this module is tightening: Alaska has moved from a position with no state-specific licensing instrument addressing virtual currency activity to a functioning, NMLS-administered licensing perimeter covering both general virtual-currency business activity and kiosk-specific operation. This is a structural development rather than an enforcement-driven one; no action against an existing unlicensed operator has been identified this cycle, and the characterisation in available commentary is of a regulatory gap being closed proactively rather than a response to a documented incident.

The newly-commenced perimeter is best understood as still in an early, unsettled state. Both statutes took effect only three days before the close of this research window, which constrains confidence in any claim about how the licensing requirement is being operationalised in practice, as distinct from what the enacted text requires on its face. The enrolled-statute section numbers underpinning SB 86's virtual-currency provisions have been confirmed only against sectional and secondary summaries rather than directly verified, which is recorded as an open gap rather than resolved this cycle.

Outlook

The central open question for this module is whether the Division of Banking and Securities has issued, or will shortly issue, implementing regulations or NMLS filing guidance specific to the two new licensing tracks. Until such guidance surfaces, firms assessing their obligations under SB 86 and SB 249 are working from the enacted statutory text and secondary legal commentary alone. A further open item is direct confirmation of the enrolled statute's own section numbers for the virtual-currency provisions, which would allow the civil-penalty figure and other numeric details currently sourced from secondary commentary to be verified against the primary text. Given the structural rather than incident-driven nature of this commencement, the near-term trajectory is likely to be one of operational bedding-in, as existing and prospective kiosk operators move through the licensing and location-approval process, rather than any near-term legislative reversal.

Periodic update · new data 2026-09-28

Crypto Licensing

Alaska SB 86 (Chapter 48 SLA 26) settles a question that had previously been managed on an ad hoc basis: whether virtual-currency exchange and custody activity conducted on behalf of another person requires a state money-transmission license. The statute, modernizing AS 06.55 and replacing the 2007 Uniform Money Services Act with a framework aligned to the Model Money Transmission Modernization Act, answers that question affirmatively and unambiguously by adding a dedicated Virtual Currency Business Activity article. Enactment is confirmed directly on the Alaska Legislatures own bill-tracking record, with a status date of 2026-07-02 and chapter designation Chapter 48 SLA 26.

The licensing bar for virtual-currency businesses specifically is now materially higher than for conventional money transmitters. The Division of Banking and Securities own licensing checklist confirms that virtual-currency applicants must post a 500,000 dollar electronic surety bond under AS 06.55.104(f), against a 25,000 dollar base bond required of standard money transmitters. This twentyfold multiple is a direct, primary-sourced data point on how Alaska calibrates its risk view of virtual-currency custody and transmission relative to conventional money-services business, and it represents a meaningful capital commitment that smaller or earlier-stage virtual-currency operators will need to plan around before seeking Alaska licensure.

Prior to SB 86, virtual-currency businesses in Alaska appear to have operated under a less codified framework, with licensing handled through arrangements such as Limited Licensing Agreements rather than a dedicated statutory track purpose-built for virtual-currency activity. The enactment of SB 86 therefore represents the closing of what had been, in effect, a supervisory gap: virtual-currency exchange and custody activity is now unambiguously within the states money-transmission licensing perimeter, with its own bonding requirement calibrated specifically to that activity rather than borrowed wholesale from the conventional money-transmitter track.

The practical significance of this shift should be read against the backdrop of Alaskas existing money-transmission licensee population. While the crypto-specific breakdown of licensee counts sits with the financial-integrity and world-payments monitors sourcing, the core regulatory fact for this monitor is that the licensing requirement itself has moved from an ambiguous or ad hoc posture to a settled, statutorily codified one, with a defined bonding threshold and a modernized statutory basis.

Outlook

The framework remains settled in statute but incomplete in its operational detail: implementing regulations and a tiered, volume-based fee structure are anticipated from the Division of Banking and Securities, expected around the first quarter of 2027 as scheduled, to replace the current flat 1,000 dollar renewal fee. Firms should treat the licensing requirement and surety-bond threshold as the settled baseline today, while anticipating that fee-structure and possibly further examination-procedure detail will be clarified once that rulemaking process concludes. Until then, the framework sits in a state where the core licensing obligation is confirmed and in force, but the full operational and fee architecture around it is still being finalized.

Periodic update · new data 2026-09-14

Crypto Licensing

Alaska has no bespoke crypto-licensing statute; virtual-currency businesses operating in or from the state are instead brought within the general Alaska Uniform Money Services Act (AS 06.55) as money transmitters, a treatment confirmed as in force since the January 2023 modernisation under SB 84. Licence applications proceed through the Nationwide Multistate Licensing System, the same channel used for conventional money-transmitter applicants, and the Division of Banking and Securities imposes a materially higher capital bar on virtual-currency applicants: a five-hundred-thousand-dollar electronic surety bond under AS 06.55.104(f), against a base twenty-five-thousand-dollar bond for standard money transmitters. The Division's own stated rationale for the differential is cryptocurrency price volatility, framing the elevated bond explicitly as a consumer-protection measure rather than a general prudential buffer.

The regime's active character was confirmed this cycle when the Division placed Coinme Inc.'s money-transmitter licence renewal, filed under licence number AKMT-014762, on hold in December 2025. The stated basis was Coinme's failure to maintain permissible investments sufficient to match its outstanding payment-instrument and stored-value obligations, a solvency-based deficiency rather than a conduct or disclosure failing. Coinme was offered a choice between surrendering the licence with an orderly wind-down or requesting an administrative hearing, with the underlying licence set to expire December 31, 2025 absent resolution. This is, on the evidence available this cycle, a functioning regulatory regime demonstrating genuine supervisory teeth rather than a dormant licensing formality: the elevated bonding requirement and the willingness to withhold renewal over a permissible-investment shortfall both point toward active, substantive supervision of virtual-currency money-transmission activity within the state.

What remains unresolved is the ultimate disposition of the Coinme matter itself, whether the company proceeded to surrender-and-wind-down or to an administrative hearing, and this is a live gap in the evidence base this cycle. A second open question is whether the Division applies the same five-hundred-thousand-dollar bonding tier to crypto-ATM operators as it does to exchange and custody businesses, or instead applies a lower tier reflecting a different risk assessment; no evidence resolving this distinction was located this cycle. Both gaps bear directly on how the licensing regime will be applied to the next wave of virtual-currency applicants in the state.

Outlook

The most consequential near-term development to track is the resolution of Coinme's licence status: a surrender-with-wind-down would materially shrink the roster of licensed crypto-cash-exchange operators serving Alaska, while a successful administrative hearing would confirm the licensee's ability to remedy a permissible-investment deficiency under supervisory pressure. Either outcome will inform how the next cohort of virtual-currency MTL applicants, and the Division itself, calibrate expectations around the elevated bonding and permissible-investment requirements going forward.

1 further periodic run re-emitted the standing brief unchanged and is not shown.

Sources and findings (1)
  1. T1 · Conference of State Bank Supervisors / State Regulatory Registry LLCConference of State Bank Supervisors / State Regulatory Registry LLC — Crypto-asset exchange, custody, and money-transmission businesses operating in Alaska are required to hold a money-transmitter license administered under the state's general money-transmission licensing law, using the multistate NMLS licensing infrastructure, rather than a bespoke crypto-specific licence.retrieved M4bindingin force

#

Alaska does not operate an independent token-classification regime. Per the seed disambiguation, characterization of crypto assets as securities or commodities is governed entirely by federal law, most recently via the March 2026 SEC/CFTC joint interpretive taxonomy defining digital securities, digital commodities, digital collectibles, digital tools, and stablecoins.

Absence reason not determinableNo sub-brief exists and the JID records no gap or review marker explaining why. The renderer will not invent a reason.

no periodic updates on record for this sub-brief

Sources and findings (1)
  1. T1 · U.S. Securities and Exchange CommissionU.S. Securities and Exchange Commission — Token classification for crypto assets held or transacted by Alaska residents and entities is determined at the federal level; the SEC and CFTC jointly issued an interpretive release, effective March 23, 2026, establishing categories including digital securities, digital commodities, digital collectibles, digital tools, and stablecoins, applicable nationwide including Alaska in the absence of any state-level classification rule.retrieved M4bindingin force

#

No Alaska-specific rules govern staking, mining, DeFi, node operation, or validator activity. In the absence of state legislation, the operative framework for Alaska-based participants is the federal SEC/CFTC interpretive position on how such activities interact with securities law.

Absence reason not determinableNo sub-brief exists and the JID records no gap or review marker explaining why. The renderer will not invent a reason.

no periodic updates on record for this sub-brief

Sources and findings (1)
  1. T3 · CoinDeskCoinDesk — Federal guidance issued jointly by the SEC and CFTC in March 2026 excludes protocol staking and protocol mining from the 'digital securities' scope of the federal securities laws, a position that governs Alaska-based validators and miners in the absence of any state-specific on-chain activity rule.retrieved M3bindingin force

#

Stablecoin issuance, reserve, redemption, and disclosure requirements applicable to Alaska are governed by the federal GENIUS Act (signed into law July 18, 2025), not by any bespoke Alaska stablecoin statute. State money-transmitter licensing continues to apply to stablecoin-related money transmission pending full GENIUS Act implementation; federal regulators missed the one-year (July 18, 2026) statutory rulemaking deadline, leaving several implementing details unsettled.

Standing sub-brief · as of 14 September 2026317 words · last cycle 2026-10-11

Stablecoin Regime

Alaska has no state-specific stablecoin framework; the applicable regime this cycle is exclusively federal, arising from implementing rulemaking under the GENIUS Act. In March 2026 the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency issued a notice of proposed rulemaking setting out issuance requirements for national-bank-subsidiary and federally qualified nonbank payment-stablecoin issuers, and in April 2026 the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation issued its own GENIUS Act notice of proposed rulemaking establishing reserve, disclosure, and safety-and-soundness standards for FDIC-supervised permitted payment-stablecoin issuers, alongside provisions addressing tokenized deposits. Both proposals remain at the consultation stage; neither has been confirmed as finalised this cycle, and the finalisation of implementing regulations is expected around the first quarter of 2027, at which point permitted payment-stablecoin issuers would become subject to settled prudential and AML/sanctions rules under the GENIUS Act.

Periodic update · new data 2026-10-11

Stablecoin Regime

Alaska has no dedicated stablecoin statute, but SB86's reenactment of AS 06.55 introduces a general reserve-adequacy duty that functions as partial coverage for stablecoin-adjacent activity. A licensed virtual-currency money transmitter must maintain sufficient amounts of each type of virtual currency to satisfy customer entitlements. This obligation arises under the general money-transmission safety-and-soundness framework rather than from any instrument purpose-built for stablecoins, meaning its scope, measurement methodology, and enforcement mechanics are inherited from the broader money-transmission licensing regime rather than tailored to stablecoin-specific risks such as peg stability or redemption-queue management.

The obligation applies to licensed virtual-currency money transmitters generally and took effect alongside the rest of SB86 on June 30, 2026, though its practical administration depends on implementing guidance from the Division of Banking and Securities that has not been confirmed as adopted this period. Because the duty is framed in terms of customer-entitlement satisfaction rather than a specific reserve ratio, asset-composition rule, or attestation cadence, it leaves open questions about how compliance would be measured or audited in practice.

Outlook

Whether the Division of Banking and Securities will issue more specific reserve-composition or attestation requirements under its SB86 rulemaking authority, and whether any dedicated stablecoin instrument will be introduced separately from the general money-transmission statute, remain open questions for the period ahead.

1 earlier distinct update(s)
Periodic update · new data 2026-10-04

Stablecoin Regime

Alaska has no bespoke, stablecoin-specific statute. The development of note this cycle is that Senate Bill 86's general virtual-currency provisions, which took effect on 1 October 2026, now extend by operation of the statute's broad definition to stablecoins held by licensees on behalf of customers. Specifically, SB 86 requires licensees to safeguard virtual currency held on behalf of customers and to maintain sufficient holdings to satisfy customer entitlements. Because the statute's definition of virtual currency is general rather than instrument-specific, this safeguarding and entitlement obligation applies to stablecoins without any separate stablecoin-specific provision being necessary. This finding is assessed as Probable: it rests on Tier 3 secondary legal commentary characterising the general provision's reach to stablecoins, rather than on a primary source that names stablecoins explicitly.

The primary framework anchor for this module is therefore AS 06.55's general virtual-currency safeguarding provisions, as introduced by SB 86, with the Alaska Division of Banking and Securities as the supervisory authority, the same regulator and the same statutory chapter governing the broader money-transmission licensing perimeter. There is no separate licensing track, capital requirement, or reserve-composition rule specific to stablecoins as a distinct instrument category in Alaska; stablecoin-holding licensees are governed by the same safeguarding and customer-entitlement standard that applies to virtual currency generally.

The trajectory for this module is tightening, in the sense that a safeguarding obligation that previously had no explicit state-level anchor for virtual-currency holdings, stablecoins included, now has one by virtue of SB 86's commencement. This is a narrower and more indirect form of stablecoin regulation than exists in jurisdictions with bespoke stablecoin-issuer licensing or reserve-backing regimes; Alaska's approach regulates the custodial and safeguarding conduct of a licensed virtual-currency business handling stablecoins, rather than regulating the issuance of a stablecoin itself.

No claims regarding stablecoin issuance, reserve composition, redemption rights, or algorithmic-stablecoin treatment have been identified for Alaska this cycle, and none should be inferred from the general safeguarding provision described above. The scope of this module's development is confined to the custodial-safeguarding question for licensees that happen to hold stablecoins among the virtual currency they administer on behalf of customers.

Outlook

The principal open question is the degree to which Alaska's general safeguarding and customer-entitlement standard will, in practice, be interpreted or enforced by the Division of Banking and Securities as applying with the same rigor to stablecoins as to other forms of virtual currency, given that the statute does not name stablecoins as a distinct category. Absent implementing guidance from the Division specific to stablecoin-holding licensees, this remains an extension by general definition rather than a settled, tested standard. No bespoke Alaska stablecoin-issuer regime has been identified, and none is indicated as forthcoming in the record reviewed this cycle.

Sources and findings (3)
  1. T4 · The BlockThe Block — Under the federal GENIUS Act, signed into law July 18, 2025, only permitted entities — federally chartered banks, OCC-supervised nonbank issuers, and certified state-qualified issuers — may issue payment stablecoins to U.S. customers, a framework that will apply uniformly to Alaska absent a state regime certified as substantially similar to the federal one.retrieved M4bindingenacted not yet effective
  2. T4 · The BlockThe Block — The GENIUS Act requires payment stablecoin issuers to maintain liquid reserve backing and publish periodic reserve disclosures; implementing rulemaking by the OCC, Federal Reserve, FDIC, and NCUA remained incomplete after federal regulators missed the one-year (July 18, 2026) statutory deadline for final rules.retrieved M4bindingenacted not yet effective
  3. T4 · The BlockThe Block — The GENIUS Act obligates payment stablecoin issuers to back every stablecoin with liquid assets, publish reserve disclosures, and honor customer redemptions as a condition of federal authorization, applicable nationwide including Alaska absent a certified state-level regime.retrieved M4bindingenacted not yet effective

#

Alaska's Division of Banking and Securities has issued public investor-protection warnings specific to cryptocurrency risk, though no crypto-specific binding consumer-protection statute exists; general Alaska securities antifraud provisions and NASAA-aligned guidance apply by default.

Standing sub-brief · as of 25 August 2026110 words · last cycle 2026-10-18

Consumer Protection

SB 249 (Ch. 50 SLA 26) requires mandatory fraud warnings and bilingual disclosures at Alaska virtual-currency kiosk locations, effective 1 October 2026. The same statute creates a refund pathway for Alaska residents defrauded via virtual-currency kiosk transfers. Both provisions mark a shift from an unregulated kiosk consumer landscape to one with defined disclosure and remediation obligations, and both are enacted but not yet in force.

Periodic update · new data 2026-10-18

Consumer Protection

Alaska's consumer-protection framework for virtual-currency activity now operates on two tracks with different timelines. The faster track, created by SB249 (Ch. 50 SLA 26) and in force since 1 October 2026, applies to virtual-currency kiosks specifically: operators must provide fraud warnings and bilingual disclosures at kiosks, and must refund customers for fraudulent transactions. These requirements sit alongside the kiosk licensing and prior-approval regime created by the same statute.

The slower track, created by SB86 (Ch. 48 SLA 26), applies more broadly to virtual-currency business activity and establishes a custody-style safeguarding duty: licensees must protect customers' property interests and entitlements in virtual currency held on their behalf, and must meet fee, exchange-rate and error-resolution disclosure duties. These SB86 consumer-protection provisions are enacted but not yet effective, with most commencing 1 July 2027 alongside the broader licensing requirement.

The kiosk-specific protections under SB249 were tested in practice almost immediately after taking effect. The Alaska Division of Banking and Securities co-led a 34-state, 2.5 million dollar consent order against Coinme, Inc., a virtual-currency kiosk operator, requiring a shutdown of its kiosks and an independent BSA/AML program review following findings of BSA/AML program failure. While the settlement's formal basis is a BSA/AML compliance failure rather than a direct consumer-protection breach, the practical consumer-facing consequence, removal of non-compliant kiosks from the Alaska market, occurred within a week of the kiosk disclosure and refund requirements taking effect, illustrating that the state's new consumer-facing kiosk rules are backed by an active enforcement posture.

Taken as a whole, Alaska's consumer protection regime for virtual currency is currently strongest and most enforceable at the kiosk point of sale, where fraud warnings, disclosures and refund rights are already operative, and is building toward a broader custody-and-disclosure standard for virtual-currency business activity generally that does not commence until mid-2027.

Outlook

In the near term, the kiosk-specific consumer protections under SB249, fraud warnings, bilingual disclosures and refund rights, remain the most immediately enforceable consumer-facing requirements in Alaska, and the Coinme settlement indicates active regulatory attention to this channel. The broader custody-safeguarding and disclosure duties under SB86 will become the dominant consumer-protection framework for virtual-currency business activity generally once they commence 1 July 2027, extending property-interest protections beyond the kiosk channel to exchange, transfer, storage and administration services more broadly.

4 earlier distinct update(s)
Periodic update · new data 2026-10-11

Consumer Protection

SB86 introduces a new consumer-facing disclosure duty for licensed virtual-currency money transmitters operating in Alaska. Covered licensees must provide disclosures addressing fees, insurance coverage, transaction risks, error-resolution procedures, and account changes. This represents a new obligation layered onto the modernised money-transmission licensing regime established by the Alaska Uniform Money Transmission Modernization Act, Ch. 48 SLA 2026, which took effect June 30, 2026.

The disclosure duty sits alongside, but is distinct from, the general reserve-adequacy requirement: where the reserve duty addresses the licensee's own solvency and asset-sufficiency position, the disclosure duty addresses what information the licensee must communicate to the end customer about the nature and risks of the service. No dedicated custody-segregation statute or market-abuse provision specific to virtual currency was identified in the record for Alaska; the consumer-protection coverage currently rests on this disclosure obligation and on the general money-transmission licensing structure rather than on bespoke custody or trading-conduct rules.

The practical consumer-impact dimension of this module is illustrated by the Bitcoin Depot insolvency: Bitcoin Depot, holder of Alaska money-transmission licence AKMT-013176, filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy in May 2026 and shut down its bitcoin-ATM network, prompting the Division of Banking and Securities to issue a consumer alert regarding potential refund eligibility for affected Alaskans. This event occurred under the pre-SB86 licensing structure and demonstrates the kind of consumer exposure the new disclosure duties are positioned to address going forward.

Outlook

How the Division of Banking and Securities will supervise and enforce the new disclosure duties in practice, including whether further rulemaking will specify disclosure format or timing, remains to be seen as the SB86 regime matures.

Periodic update · new data 2026-10-04

Consumer Protection

Alaska's consumer-protection posture for virtual-currency activity tightened substantially with the 1 October 2026 commencement of Senate Bill 249, the Virtual Currency Kiosks Act (Ch. 50 SLA 26). The statute enacts a kiosk-specific consumer-protection package built around disclosure, verification, transactional limits, and a statutory remedy for fraud victims. Kiosk operators must post conspicuous fraud warnings at each machine, verify a user's government-issued identification before completing a transaction, and provide receipts that disclose fees, exchange rates and transaction details. This disclosure and verification requirement is assessed as Probable, corroborated by the legislature's companion fiscal note, a Tier 1 source, for the general obligation, though the precise formatting and placement requirements for the fraud warnings themselves have not been independently verified against the enrolled statute's pinpoint citations.

The statute also imposes transactional limits intended to bound consumer loss exposure. Kiosk transactions are capped at a reported one thousand dollars per user per day and ten thousand dollars per user per thirty-day period, and transaction fees are separately capped, although the exact fee-cap percentage is disputed across sources: an earlier committee draft reported a figure of three percent, while post-enactment commentary reports a figure of ten percent, and the enrolled statute's own fee-cap provision has not been directly retrieved this cycle to resolve the discrepancy. This transaction-cap finding is accordingly assessed as Uncertain pending that resolution, notwithstanding that the existence of some cap is well corroborated.

The most consumer-protective element of the new statute is a dedicated statutory remedy for fraud victims. SB 249 creates a right to a refund of the transaction amount and associated fees where a kiosk transaction is proven to be the result of fraud, and requires each kiosk to maintain a dedicated communication channel to law enforcement. This refund right and the associated law-enforcement channel requirement are assessed as Probable, corroborated directly by the legislature's companion fiscal note, a Tier 1 source.

The cumulative primary framework for this module spans AS 06.55.115 through .190, the kiosk-specific provisions introduced by SB 249, together with AS 06.55's general safeguarding provisions carried over from SB 86, both administered by the Alaska Division of Banking and Securities. The overall trajectory is tightening: before this commencement, Alaska had no kiosk-specific consumer-protection statute, and the combination of mandatory fraud warnings, identity verification, transaction and fee caps, and a statutory fraud-refund right represents a materially more protective posture than existed previously for kiosk users.

Outlook

The principal unresolved item in this module is the fee-cap percentage, where a three-percent figure from an earlier legislative draft and a ten-percent figure from post-enactment commentary remain in tension pending direct retrieval of the enrolled statute's own fee-cap language. A secondary open item is confirmation of the enrolled-statute pinpoint citations for the fraud-warning and identification-verification requirements, which have so far been confirmed only at the level of general obligation rather than precise statutory text. Practical effectiveness of the new refund right and the law-enforcement communication channel will likely only become observable once the regime has operated long enough to generate reportable refund-request data under the kiosk reporting requirements that accompany this same statute.

Periodic update · new data 2026-09-28

Consumer Protection

Alaska SB 86 introduces the states first codified consumer-protection duties specific to virtual-currency businesses, layered onto the new licensing structure described elsewhere in this brief. Covered virtual-currency licensees must now provide disclosures addressing fees, insurance coverage, transaction risks, error resolution, and account changes, and must maintain sufficient amounts of each type of virtual currency to satisfy customer entitlements. These requirements are reported via a law-firm summary of the enacted statute rather than the bill text itself, though they are consistent with the broader SB 86 licensing overhaul confirmed on the Alaska Legislatures own record.

The disclosure requirements cover a meaningful span of the consumer-facing risk surface associated with virtual-currency custody and transmission: fee transparency, insurance-coverage status, transaction-risk disclosure, error-resolution procedures, and notice of account changes. Taken together with the customer-entitlement-coverage requirement, which obliges licensees to hold sufficient amounts of each type of virtual currency to satisfy what they owe customers, this represents a shift from a prior environment with no codified virtual-currency-specific consumer-protection standard to one with explicit statutory duties directly tied to licensure.

This consumer-protection dimension of SB 86 should be read as a distinct but related development from the licensing and bonding requirements: where the licensing article settles who must be licensed and on what bonding terms, the consumer-protection provisions settle what licensed virtual-currency businesses owe their Alaska customers on an ongoing basis. Both provisions trace to the same enacting statute and share the same effective posture, with a stated recency date of 2026-06-30 for the disclosure and customer-entitlement-coverage requirements.

Outlook

As with the licensing requirements, the consumer-protection provisions of SB 86 are in force, but the surrounding regulatory detail, including any forthcoming Division of Banking and Securities guidance on how disclosure and customer-entitlement-coverage obligations will be examined or enforced in practice, remains to be clarified through the anticipated implementing-regulation process expected around the first quarter of 2027 as scheduled. Firms operating under Alaska virtual-currency licenses should treat the disclosure and customer-entitlement-coverage duties as current, binding obligations rather than provisional or forthcoming requirements.

Periodic update · new data 2026-09-14

Consumer Protection

Alaska's consumer-protection approach to virtual-currency money-services activity is solvency-based rather than disclosure-based. The Division of Banking and Securities requires virtual-currency licensees to maintain permissible investments with a market value not less than the aggregate of their outstanding payment-instrument and stored-value obligations, a requirement enforced directly through the licence-renewal review process rather than through periodic disclosure filings or consumer-facing risk warnings. This mechanism sits alongside, and is reinforced by, the elevated five-hundred-thousand-dollar electronic surety bond imposed on virtual-currency applicants under AS 06.55.104(f), which the Division has explicitly justified on consumer-protection grounds given the price volatility characteristic of cryptocurrency assets.

The practical operation of this consumer-protection architecture was demonstrated this cycle by the Division's action against Coinme Inc., whose licence renewal was placed on hold in December 2025 specifically for failing to satisfy the permissible-investment requirement. This is a direct illustration of the regime functioning as intended: rather than a disclosure obligation that a consumer must interpret, the state's mechanism is a solvency test applied by the regulator itself at the point of licence renewal, with the consequence of a licensing hold, and potential surrender or wind-down, falling on the licensee rather than requiring the consumer to detect and act on a risk disclosure.

This is a materially different model to disclosure-centric consumer-protection regimes seen elsewhere, and it places the burden of ensuring adequate backing of stored-value and payment-instrument obligations on the regulator's periodic review rather than on the consumer's own diligence. No additional Alaska-specific consumer-protection mechanism, such as a mandated consumer-facing risk warning or a state-specific reserve-attestation requirement, was identified this cycle beyond the permissible-investment and bonding framework already described.

Outlook

The Coinme matter is the operative test case for this consumer-protection architecture, and its resolution, whether by surrender-with-wind-down or administrative hearing, will demonstrate in practice how the Division balances licensee remediation against consumer exposure when a permissible-investment shortfall is identified. Any future extension of solvency-based consumer protection to other categories of virtual-currency business, such as stablecoin issuers operating under the emerging federal GENIUS Act framework, is not yet evidenced in this jurisdiction.

1 further periodic run re-emitted the standing brief unchanged and is not shown.

Sources and findings (1)
  1. T3 · CoinDeskCoinDesk — In January 2018 the director of Alaska's Division of Banking and Securities publicly cautioned residents that cryptocurrencies are not a typical investment and warned of fraud and volatility risk, as part of a broader state-regulator effort to increase consumer awareness of crypto risk.retrieved M2non-binding

#

No Alaska-specific crypto tax statute exists. Alaska levies no state individual income tax, so crypto-related income and capital-gains taxation exposure for individuals is governed exclusively at the federal level under IRS Notice 2014-21, which treats virtual currency as property for U.S. federal tax purposes. State-level exposure, if any, would be limited to Alaska's corporate income tax on business entities, which has not been independently verified for crypto-specific treatment in this pass.

Absence reason not determinableNo sub-brief exists and the JID records no gap or review marker explaining why. The renderer will not invent a reason.

no periodic updates on record for this sub-brief

Sources and findings (1)
  1. T1 · U.S. Commodity Futures Trading CommissionU.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission — Federal guidance (IRS Notice 2014-21) treats virtual currency as property for U.S. federal tax purposes, meaning general property-transaction tax principles — including capital gains treatment for capital assets — apply to crypto-asset dispositions by Alaska taxpayers, with no separate state income-tax layer since Alaska imposes no individual income tax.retrieved M3bindingin force

#

Alaska has no state-specific outbound-restriction or cross-border reporting regime for crypto assets. Cross-border transfer controls applicable to Alaska-based crypto businesses operate at the federal level through FinCEN's Bank Secrecy Act money-transmitter framework and OFAC sanctions screening, which apply uniformly regardless of state boundaries.

Absence reason not determinableNo sub-brief exists and the JID records no gap or review marker explaining why. The renderer will not invent a reason.

no periodic updates on record for this sub-brief

Sources and findings (1)
  1. T1 · Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) — Alaska imposes no independent state-level outbound restriction on crypto-asset cross-border transfers; exchangers and administrators of convertible virtual currency operating in or from Alaska are instead subject to the federal money-transmitter/MSB definition under FinCEN's regulations, which governs cross-border money-transmission activity nationwide.retrieved M3bindingin force

#

Crypto AML/CFT obligations applicable to Alaska are covered under the fleet's Financial Integrity (FIM) aml_ctf subscription rather than being independently researched in this crypto baseline, per the module subscription reminder. Disambiguation context only: the federal FinCEN/BSA money-services-business framework applies to Alaska-based exchangers and administrators of convertible virtual currency regardless of state boundaries; no separate Alaska AML statute for crypto has been identified.

Rules for crypto-asset service providers · from Sentinel.gi · verified 2026-07-05
  • AS 06.55.150 — A person engaging in virtual-currency business activity to, from, or within Alaska must hold a money-transmission licence under AS 06.55, unless exempt under AS 06.55.802. (in force; in force 2026-06-30) source, 2026-06-30
  • AS 06.55.990(15) transitional clause — Existing money-services licensees may continue operating under pre-SB86 licenses until the earlier of next renewal or 2028-07-01. (in force; deadline 2028-07-01) source, 2026-07-30
  • AS 06.55 (pinpoint unconfirmed; as amended by SB86 Ch. 48 SLA 26) — Virtual-currency exchange, transfer, storage and administration on behalf of customers is brought within licensed money-transmission activity, requiring NMLS-based licensing, background checks and BSA-consistent compliance. (commenced future; in force 2027-07-01) source, 2026-07-24
  • AS 06.55 (pinpoint unconfirmed; as amended by SB249 Ch. 50 SLA 26) — Virtual-currency kiosk operators must hold a money-transmission license and comply with anti-fraud/BSA-AML-consistent policies, suspicious-transaction reporting, and transaction caps. (in force; in force 2026-10-01) source, 2026-07-24

Not yet covered by Sentinel.gi for this jurisdiction: suspicious transaction reporting for CASPs: recipient FIUs, deadlines, consent or moratorium periods, account freezes, suspension duties and recognition criteria; sanctions asset freezes as distinct from AML reporting, sectoral crypto-service bans, designation list sources and crypto-relevant designations; travel rule obligations: thresholds and currency, data sets, self-hosted wallet tests, binding status of guidance and repeated-failure reporting channels; prohibitions on anonymous accounts and anonymity-enhancing assets and their application dates; wallet-address screening and on- and off-chain transaction monitoring requirements and supervisory expectations; recent changes to crypto-transfer AML instruments, including revocations and replacements.

Absence reason not determinableNo sub-brief exists and the JID records no gap or review marker explaining why. The renderer will not invent a reason.

no periodic updates on record for this sub-brief

#

## Commercial Activity The defining commercial event in Alaska's crypto sector this period is the insolvency of Bitcoin Depot. Bitcoin Depot held Alaska money-transmission licence AKMT-013176 with the Division of Banking and Securities and filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas in May 2026, subsequently taking its bitcoin-ATM network offline. The amount of any affected customer funds was not publicly disclosed. The Division of Banking and Securities issued a consumer alert addressing potential refund eligibility for affected Alaskans, indicating direct state-regulator engagement with the fallout of a licensed operator's failure. This event sits within the infrastructure-and-mining commercial sector category and represents the most material disclosed commercial development affecting Alaska's existing licensee pool during a period in which the broader licensing framework itself was also being overhauled by SB86. The insolvency predates full implementation of the SB86 regime and occurred under the legacy money-transmission licensing structure, underscoring that consumer exposure to licensed-operator failure was already a live issue before the new virtual-currency-specific licensing perimeter took effect. ## Outlook Whether other Alaska-licensed crypto-ATM or virtual-currency money-transmission operators face similar insolvency or wind-down pressure, and how the Division of Banking and Securities will handle consumer-refund processes for affected Bitcoin Depot customers, remain open questions for the period ahead.

no periodic updates on record for this sub-brief

Sources and findings (1)
  1. T1Bitcoin Depot — Bitcoin Depot, holder of AK money-transmission licence AKMT-013176, filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas in May 2026 and took its bitcoin-ATM network offline; DBS issued a consumer alert on potential refund eligibility for affected Alaskans.retrieved M3non-binding
No categories match.

Filters combine as OR inside a group and AND across groups.

Publication gate

No failing checks.

schema_validpass
min_quoted_text_presentwaived — floor 0%
egress_verifiedpass
every_practical_object_has_source_idn/a — no subject in this jurisdiction
source_tier_integrity_okpass
jurisdiction_source_floor_metpass
tier_a_b_national_primary_pct54.55
aggregator_only_jurisdiction_count0
manual_override

Editorial metadata

Provenance only. Nothing below gates publication or affects the render.

Editorial metadata for Alaska, USA
FieldValue
trust.lawyer_review.statusnever_reviewed
trust.lawyer_review.reviewerno reviewer on record
trust.content_sourceai_generated

Provenance and declared absence

Disclosure model: module cards load OPEN; standing positions render in full; sub-briefs and jurisdiction briefs load as a clamped teaser with an explicit “read full” control carrying the true word count; earlier updates stay collapsed behind a counted summary. No text is hidden without disclosing how much of it there is.

Sentinel-fed modules receive no special rendering treatment. sentinel_feed is an attribution chip only: it does not suppress content, does not generate an absence reason code, and does not exclude the module from any count, filter, search index or export on this page.

Family taxonomy is renderer-level presentation config, not a JID field. Colour is always duplicated in text and is never the sole carrier of meaning.

Suppressed by doctrine: derived risk score; per-module RAG traffic light; derived_scores = {}.

Band honesty: uncertainty bands are computed against a frozen build clock of 2026-10-20. A year-precision row is never promoted into a tighter band.

Orphan deltas: 0 cycle_delta row(s) target non-module objects and are listed in the rail rather than attached to a card.

Envelope: baseline resolved at jurisdiction_json.baseline; 9 module(s), 10 finding(s), 34 source(s) in the cumulative register.

Think something on this page is wrong? Report an error.