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MiCA (Regulation (EU) 2023/1114), implemented nationally via Lei n.º 69/2025, applies directly and is fully in force. Supervisory responsibility splits between CMVM (CASP authorisation/conduct, Titles II & VI) and Banco de Portugal (ART/EMT issuer authorisation and prudential supervision, Titles III & IV), confirmed via ESMA's Article 93 competent-authority list. Despite the regime being fully in force and the Article 143(3) grandfathering window having closed on 1 July 2026 per ESMA's public statement, Portugal's ESMA interim register showed zero authorised CASPs as of mid-2026, versus 57 in Germany and 26 each in France and the Netherlands.
The regime's practical bite, however, diverges sharply from its formal completeness. As of mid-2026, Portugal's entry in ESMA's interim MiCA register showed zero authorised CASPs, against 57 in Germany and 26 each in France and the Netherlands. This finding rests on a single T4 news source (The Block), corroborated by two further T4 outlets (Incrypted, Cointelegraph) reporting the same cross-EU register figures; absent a directly cited T1/T2 primary source, the crypto guardrail Confidence Floor caps this claim at Probable rather than Confirmed, and that downgrade has been applied and carried through composition unchanged.
Compounding the authorisation gap, MiCA's Article 143(3) transitional (grandfathering) provision — which had permitted pre-existing Portuguese virtual-asset service providers to continue operating pending authorisation or its refusal — formally closed on 1 July 2026, per ESMA's 23 June 2026 public statement. Any legacy entity that has not by now secured MiCA authorisation is required to have wound down crypto-asset services in Portugal. Given the mid-2026 zero-authorisation count, this creates a live supervisory and market-access uncertainty: it is not established from current sourcing whether any legacy entities continued operating past the deadline, nor what enforcement posture CMVM or Banco de Portugal has taken toward them. That question remains open in the gaps register rather than resolved here.
Outlook
The immediate forward marker is enforcement follow-through: whether CMVM and Banco de Portugal move visibly against any unauthorised legacy operators now that the transitional window has closed, and whether Portugal's authorisation count moves off zero as pending applications (if any) clear. The current record also flags, but does not resolve, whether Portugal's Banco de Portugal/CMVM dual-authority model should eventually be treated as a JID-split candidate analogous to the Netherlands' DNB/AFM structure — a pipeline-wiring question for a later cycle, not a judgment this composition makes. Confidence on the authorisation-throughput figure should be expected to firm toward Confirmed only once a T1/T2 primary citation to the live ESMA register is obtained.
No periodic updates recorded against this sub-brief.
Sources and findings (4)
- T1Crypto-asset service providers (CASPs) operating in Portugal — MiCA authorisation, with ongoing supervision split: CMVM (CASPs, Titles II & VI) and Banco de Portugal (ART/EMT issuer authorisation & prudential supervision, Titles III & IV)retrieved M5bindingin forcenew
- T1Lei n.º 69/2025 (Portugal's national MiCA implementing law) — Banco de Portugal and CMVM, per MiCA Article 94, including a sanctions regime for crypto-asset market abuseretrieved M5bindingin forcenew
- T1MiCA Article 143(3) grandfathering clause (Portugal) — 1 July 2026, or grant/refusal of MiCA authorisation if earlier — this transitional window has now concluded per ESMA's public statement of 23 June 2026; unauthorised legacy entities must wind down crypto-asset services in Portugalretrieved M4non-bindingupdated
- T4Portugal (MiCA-authorised CASP count) — mid-2026, per ESMA's interim MiCA register, versus Germany (57), France and Netherlands (26 each)retrieved M5non-bindingupdated