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New Zealand has no dedicated crypto-licensing statute; coverage is assembled from AML/CFT Act 2009 registration duties applicable to crypto-asset/VASP businesses (as 'financial institutions', sourced to the FATF/APG 2021 mutual evaluation, T2) and FMC Act 2013 market-conduct licensing for tokens classified as financial products (sourced to 2017 FMA guidance via CoinDesk, T3). Cabinet abandoned a previously reported blanket crypto-ATM ban in July 2026, replacing it with a proposed regulation-making power for targeted controls under the AML/CFT (Omnibus) Amendment Bill (T1, Beehive.govt.nz), correcting a stale baseline claim.
The most significant development in this module this cycle is a reversal, not an advance. New Zealand's Cabinet, in a July 2026 decision, will not proceed with a previously reported proposal for a blanket ban on crypto ATMs. That ban had been described in earlier reporting as forthcoming under a 2025 AML/CFT Amendment Bill; the underlying source for that description was, by the time of this cycle's research, roughly a month stale relative to the actual policy outcome. The corrected position, confirmed via an official Beehive.govt.nz government release and corroborated by secondary reporting from RNZ and OpenGov Asia, is that the AML/CFT (Omnibus) Amendment Bill will instead carry a regulation-making power enabling targeted controls -- such as cash-transaction thresholds -- rather than a categorical prohibition on the machines themselves. This is a materially different regulatory posture: targeted, calibrated intervention through subordinate regulation-making authority, rather than an outright ban embedded in primary legislation. The claim is not binding as it stands, since the regulation-making power itself remains a bill provision pending enactment, and no specific thresholds or commencement date have yet been set.
Taken together, the picture for this module is one of partial, indirect coverage rather than a coherent crypto-specific licensing code. AML/CFT registration duties and FMC Act product-based licensing supply the only binding obligations that currently touch crypto businesses, and both rest on secondary sourcing that has not been independently reconfirmed against primary regulator or legislative text this cycle. The crypto-ATM policy reversal illustrates how quickly such secondary-sourced positions can become stale, and reinforces the case for direct verification of AML/CFT Act and FMC Act provisions before any binding compliance guidance is drawn from this record.
Outlook
The regulation-making power for crypto-ATM controls is the item to watch most closely: its introduction, drafting, and passage through the AML/CFT (Omnibus) Amendment Bill will determine whether targeted thresholds materialise, and on what timeline. No specific cash-transaction threshold or commencement date has been confirmed. Separately, the underlying AML/CFT registration and FMC Act licensing findings would benefit from direct confirmation against FMA.govt.nz and legislation.govt.nz, given that both currently rest on T2/T3 secondary sourcing rather than primary regulatory text. Absent a dedicated crypto-licensing statute, New Zealand's regime is likely to remain a composite of AML/CFT and securities-law overlays for the near term, with the Omnibus Bill's progress as the principal near-term catalyst for change.
No periodic updates recorded against this sub-brief.
Sources and findings (3)
- T2New Zealand crypto-asset/VASP businesses — the applicable AML/CFT supervisor (DIA, FMA, or RBNZ) under the AML/CFT Act 2009 as 'financial institutions'retrieved M4bindingin forceupdated
- T3FMA — crypto-asset tokens classified as financial products (debt security, equity security, managed investment product, or derivative) under the FMC Act 2013retrieved M4bindingin forcenew
- T1New Zealand Cabinet — Following a July 2026 Cabinet decision, New Zealand will not proceed with a blanket ban on crypto ATMs; the AML/CFT (Omnibus) Amendment Bill will instead include a regulation-making power for targeted controls (e.g. cash-transaction thresholds), superseding the earlier blanket-ban proposal.retrieved M3non-bindingproposedupdated